In Belarus’ poker game, Russia holds a winning hand
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Long-term watchers of Belarus are accustomed to hearing that “this time it’s different.”
The country’s situation has been stably precarious for decades, as President Alexander Lukashenko has adroitly managed the balancing act between Russia and the West, extracting the maximum possible benefits from both. Crises in Belarus have each time presented the possibility of a decisive Russian intervention to head off any possibility of Minsk turning its back on Moscow and embracing the West. But each time they have passed as the drama subsides.
Against this background, the current eruption of anger in Belarus is all the more unprecedented. The will and endurance of protesters, fueled by anger at arbitrary and violent arrests followed by abuse and brutality while in detention, has taken all sides by surprise: outside observers, the Belarusian authorities and, to some extent, the protesters themselves.
But for Russia, this has all the ingredients of a long-brewing crisis that has now come to a head, one that may require urgent and decisive intervention — up to and including military action.
Russia’s two most recent military interventions, in Ukraine and Syria, have been in response to what seemed in Moscow a rapidly deteriorating situation that needed immediate action to avoid disaster. In Ukraine, this was the notion that the country would be “lost” to Russian influence as it cemented relations with Western institutions; in Syria, it was the imminent prospect of Western airstrikes against the forces of Moscow's ally Bashar al-Assad, with the dismal precedent of Libya a few years before suggesting this would trigger a whole range of ruinous second- and third-order effects.
The Kremlin will not want its subjects to follow the example set by ordinary Belarusian people, finding the courage to make a stand against political fraud and face down riot police.
There are many differences between Belarus and Ukraine; but also, when considering the possibility of Russian intervention, key similarities. Instability, and the danger of losing an effective veto on Belarus aligning itself with Western alliances, would cause just as deep concern in the Kremlin today as it did with Ukraine in 2014.
For Moscow, the threat is not just losing Belarus. Already dealing with an outbreak of popular dissent in its far eastern region of Khabarovsk, the Kremlin will not want its subjects to follow the example set by ordinary Belarusian people, finding the courage to make a stand against political fraud and face down riot police.
Strikes, and instances of serving and former police and armed forces personnel siding with the protesters will be all the more alarming to Moscow. If people power is allowed to succeed in Belarus, this shows that there can be a direct and immediate threat to the foundations of power in Russia, too.
Russia, therefore, has a direct incentive to intervene abroad to maintain control at home.
Options for Russia
While there has been little official Russian commentary on the events of this week in Belarus, the mood music is not encouraging.
Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova has pointed to “clear attempts of outside meddling.” Head of Russia Today Margarita Simonyan has already called for "polite people to impose order" — for Russian special forces to seize control in Belarus as they did in Crimea.
Russia could also use the recent announcement that additional U.S. troops are to be deployed to Poland to point to a deteriorating security situation around Belarus — regardless of the decision resulting from a scramble to implement a whim of President Donald Trump rather than any genuine response to strategic needs.
In a possible indication of ebbing support for Lukashenko, Russian state media have reported on election fraud and his loss of legitimacy, while independent media have highlighted the implications of popular uprisings for Russia itself. If Moscow were to back Lukashenko now, this would incinerate much of the empathy for Russia among Belarusian civil society. Russia’s objective might therefore not be to keep Lukashenko in power but to establish a paper-thin proxy with a veneer of legitimacy.
Significant Russian military preparation might not be obvious. Reports of military movements near the border with Belarus will continue to spark alarm. The VDV airborne forces are the default option for rapid movement, but their normal level of activity is high, so any deviation could be difficult to discern immediately.
But if Russia is confident opposition will be slight, its initial move could be in the form of the paramilitary National Guard (Rosgvardiya) security forces — able to move rapidly and less visibly to outside observers than regular motor-rifle brigades. As with Syria, any Russian military or paramilitary move would be presented as meeting a “request for assistance from the legitimate government” (meaning Lukashenko) — regardless of Western assessments that that legitimacy has been irrevocably lost.
Alexander Lukashenko is expected to give an address to the nation on Saturday | Pool photo by Sergei Gapon/AFP via Getty Images
At the time of writing, Lukashenko is expected to give an address to the nation on Saturday. This will be a critical test of statesmanship — not only in how he answers to the Belarusian people, but whether in doing so he can reassure Moscow that there is no cause to get involved.
Options for the West
Despite stirrings of interest by the EU in the fate of Belarus, unwillingness to confront Russia may critically limit options. Unlike in Ukraine in 2014, a Russian intervention would come as no surprise to the West; but that is very different from saying the West is now willing or able to do anything about it. On the other hand, anything less than resolute action risks failing the Belarusian people by allowing the future of their country to be taken from them either by Lukashenko or Putin.
The few levers available include Magnitsky-style targeted sanctions, a potential effective deterrent through bringing personal consequences for named individuals for their actions.
In the event of a move by Moscow, it will be a fine balance for Europe regarding which of the two is more unacceptable — Lukashenko remaining or Russia arriving.
Events in Belarus have already shown the power of universal access to smartphones; communications and coordination between protesters may be harder while internet messaging services are suppressed, but when they return all doubts are removed as to what has been going on. This also provides the ideal means for collecting witness testimony and evidence of actions by individuals during the current abuses by Belarusian security forces, and any potential move into the country by Russian ones — for future sanctions and prosecutions.
In the event of a move by Moscow, it will be a fine balance for Europe regarding which of the two is more unacceptable — Lukashenko remaining or Russia arriving.
The EU could decide to maintain friendly relations with Lukashenko for the sake of keeping Russia out — but this would make a mockery of its stated principles and values.
Meanwhile, isolating Lukashenko with his power structure still in place could leave Belarus’s leadership no options but closer alignment with Moscow — or, if Russia chooses to act unilaterally, no options at all beyond the stark choice of resistance or capitulation.
Previously, it would have been a clear choice to support Lukashenko. Now, the actions of his interior ministry against protesters have ensured it is no longer so obvious which would be the worse betrayal of the people of Belarus.
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